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C(

)NFLICT OF LAWS-THE MIGRATORY

DIVORCE-

WILLIAMS V. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
0. B. Williams and Lillie Hendrix, each married and resident in North Carolina, left their respective spouses and went
to Nevada in May, 1940, where each filed a divorce action on
-June 26, 1940, after a mere six weeks residence. The defendants
in the divorce actions made no appearance and were not served
with process in Nevada, the services on the absent spouses being
made by publication. In one case a copy of the summons and
complaint was mailed to the absent defendant; in the other, a
North Carolina sheriff delivered a copy of the summons and
,-omplaint to the defendant. Both Mr. Williams and Irs.
Hendrix were issued divorce decrees, in each of which the
Nevada court made a specific finding that "the plaintiff has
been and is now a bona fide and continuous resident of Clark
County, Nevada, and had been such resident for more than six
weeks immediately preceding the commencement of this action
in the manner prescribed by law.'
They were then married to
each other in Nevada, on October 4, 1940, the day the second
divorce was granted, and returned to North Carolina. There
they were indicted, tried and convicted of bigamous cohabitation. They offered the Nevada decrees in their defense. The
North Carolina Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment of
conviction,- held that North Carolina was not required to give
full faith and credit to the Nevada decrees under the rule of
Haddock v. Haddock.3 The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari4 and upon the assumption that the
parties were legally domiciled in Nevada held that under such
,ircumstances the decrees of divorce were entitled to full faith
and credit, specifically overruling the decision in the Haddock
vase.
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'Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. S.289, 63 Sup. Ct.
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on the supposed invalidity of the Nevada divorce decrees or on
other grounds, and second, the State failed to question the bona
fides of the Nevada domicile.
The decision in this case presents a fundamental problem
which the Court must one day decide, namely, what kind of
residence will satisfy the requirement of domicile. Domicile has
been considered basic to divorce jurisdiction. 5 The Court did
not see fit to decide whether North Carolina courts might have
refused to recognize the Nevada decrees on the ground that the
defendant did not establish a bona fide domicile in Nevada, because the State conceded that there probably was enough evidence in the record to require that defendants be considered to
have been actually domiciled in Nevada.6 The Court therefore
dealt with the case as if domicile in Nevada had been established.
Therefore, the decision could have no effect on the well-established doctrine that the full faith and credit clause does not preclude a sister state from an investigation of jurisdictional facts.
In 1869 the Supreme Court held that a divorce decree
rendered by a court at the domicile of one of the parties, after
personal service within the state upon the other spouse, is entitled to full faith and credit.7 Several years later the Court
held that a divorce granted by the legislature of the territory
of Oregon to a domiciliary, who had deserted his wife in Ohio,
was valid within the Oregon territory., Whether the divorce
decree was entitled to recognition elsewhere was not decided by
the Court. In 1901 it was decided that a divorce granted either
spouse at the matrimonial domicile, even if there was no personal service on the defendant within the state and no appearance, was entitled to full faith and credit in other states." During the same year it was also held that a divorce granted on
constructive service in a state where neither spouse was domiAndrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179 (1901); Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901); Atherton
v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190
(1887); Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (1869); GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (2d ed) 335; STRUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 268.
'Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 289, 291: "More-

over it (North Carolina) admits that there probably is enough evidence in the record to require that petitioners be considered to have
been7actually domiciled in Nevada."

Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 108 (1869).
'Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1887).
'Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901); Thompson v.
Thompson, 226 U. S. 551 (1903).
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oiled was not entitled to compulsory recognition in any state.10
The Court refused to compel recognition in Andrews v. Andrciws,1 1 to a decree rendered in a state where neither party was
domiciled, even though the defendant personally appeared and
12
,onsented to the jurisdiction. Then in Haddock v. Haddock
the Court held that a divorce decree rendered by a court at the
domicile of one of the parties against a non-resident spouse
who was not served within the state and did not appear in the
action, need not be given full faith and credit. The reverberations resulting from this judicial bombshell continued to vibrate
until stopped by the decision in the instant case, which specifi,ally overruled it.
The question of whether or not the residence was bona fide
in the instant case is not within the scope of the decision. The
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, says: "But the
question for us is a limited one. In the first place, we repeat
that in this case we must assume that petitioners had a bona fide
domicile in Nevada, not that the Nevada domicile was a sham.
... Nor do we reach here the question as to the power of North
Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees because, contrary to the findings of the Nevada court,
North Carolina finds no bona fide domicile was acquired in
Nevada."
This, of course, simplifies the case for the Court, but
adds nothing toward clarifying the perplexing divorce-domicile-jurisdiction problem in the conflict of laws. Neither does
it disturb any state's right to question whether the jurisdiction
which the forum obtained was bona fide.
The net result of the decision appears to be that a foreign
divorce granted to one who has a bona fide domicile (residence)13 in the jurisdiction is entitled to full faith and credit
by a sister state. To reach this result it was necessary to speci14
fically overrule the ease of Haddock v. Haddock.
IRA

G.

STEPHENSON

"Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179 (1901);
U. S. 175 (1901).
"188 U. S. 14 (1903).
201 U. S. 562 (1906).
" NEv. COMP. LAWS (1931) sec. 9460.
"Divorce
of matrimony may be obtained by complaint,.....
have resided six weeks in the state before suit is
(Italics are ours).
"Supra note 12.

Bell v. Bell, 181

from the bonds

if plaintiff shall
brought ..

